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A COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUPREME 
COURT AND ITS FUNCTIONS
The University of Warsaw is to be commended for focusing attention on 
the role of a supreme court, for that can be a critical component of a court system 
and, more generally, critical also to the fair functioning of a democratic gov-
ernment (and to others, no doubt). It makes sense to start out such a conference 
considering the roles a Supreme Court can play in a judicial system, and also to 
approach that question with an eye to the somewhat divergent attitudes toward 
the judicial role of common law and civil law systems. Those differences may 
mean a lot for the role of such a court and for the organization of the Court, a topic 
to be taken up by the next panel. I hope I will not trespass too much on topics to 
be addressed by others in my presentation.
I will argue that questions of design and function – while important – prob-
ably are not more important than more elusive questions about institutional sta-
tus and evolution, something one could refer to as “legal culture.” So we must 
approach our analysis with considerable humility. Particularly here in the coun-
tries of the former Warsaw Pact, where constitutional and democratic institutions 
have taken root over the last quarter century, it is important to appreciate the per-
mutations of that sort of development.
I am here as the representative of the common law approach to the function 
of a Supreme Court, and will begin by cautioning that in some ways the common 
law v. civil divide is not entirely informative in regard to procedure, but that it 
is highly important in terms of the role of judges in “declaring” law. I will also 
speak mainly about the Supreme Court of my country, for it is a distinctive insti-
tution. That said, the US situation offers an example of functions a court may have 
that differs from the function of courts in many other judicial systems, and those 
differences can importantly be said to relate to its role in a common law system. 
At the same time, I will regard such questions as whether the Supreme Court 
should have the power of judicial review of legislation as somewhat background. 
In the US, as is well known, we have had such review since Marbury v. Madi-
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son,1 but that 1803 decision did not immediately place a stamp on our Court that 
remained unchanged for the ensuing 200 years.
I. DIVIDING THE WORLD INTO “COMMON LAW”  
AND “CIVIL LAW” SPHERES
Below I will emphasize that a common law tradition says a lot about the func-
tion of a Supreme Court as it says a lot about the function of courts in general. 
But as I’ve emphasized before,2 that divide does not stand up to close scrutiny as 
a compelling clue to procedural arrangements. So I start with a caution – not all 
common law countries are alike in terms of the function of their Supreme Court 
– but end up affirming that there seems a significant divide in terms of the role 
of judges in making law, which can be at its most important in relation to the func-
tioning of the supreme court in such a system.
One approach to the function of a supreme court is to recognize a different 
division among national judicial systems. Many report that there are two main 
prototypes – the US version with diffused constitutional review, and the central-
ized constitutional court with an “abstract” authority to pronounce on constitu-
tional matters but no other role in the judicial system. That oracular alternative 
vision of a Supreme Court is most associated with Hans Kelsen,3 and that vision 
has been cited as the model used by many European constitutional courts, not just 
Austria’s. The distinction remains an organizing technique for scholars.4 To some 
measure, it may correspond to the common law/civil law divide.
But neither the common law camp nor the civil law camp is monolithic. The 
US has had a Supreme Court almost from the outset. The UK, on the other hand, 
has formally had such a court only since 2005, less than a decade, and at least 
some notable observers were quite cool to its creation.5 And the UK court is not 
equipped with the powers the US Supreme Court announced in Marbury because 
it cannot invalidate an Act of Parliament.6 Australia, on the other hand, has had 
1 5 US 137 (1803).
2 See R. Marcus, Exceptionalism and Convergence: Form versus Content and Categorical 
Views of Procedure, (in:) J. Walker, O. G. Chase (eds.), Common Law, Civil Law, and the Future 
of Categories (2010), at 521.
3 See generally M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1971).
4 See, e.g., A. Gamper, F. Palermo, The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles of an 
Archetype of Constitutional Review in Comparative Perspective, (in:) A. Harding, P. Leyland (eds.), 
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (2009), at 31.
5 See, e.g., N. Andrews, The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court: Three Skeptical Reflections Con-
cerning the New Court, 9 “Utah Law Review” (2011).
6 Id. at 10 (“The Supreme Court lacks the power to invalidate an Act of Parliament”).
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a Supreme Court since the beginning of the 20th century, although not in a sys-
tem with separation of powers comparable to the US version.7 But the Australian 
court does function in a legal setup that involves somewhat independent judici-
aries of various Australian states, more akin to the US situation. In short, being 
a “common law” jurisdiction does not magically answer important questions 
addressed in this conference.
The “civil law” jurisdictions seem, from a distance, not to be entirely uniform 
either. Some, such as Austria, evidently adopted the pristine version of a consti-
tutional court of the sort Professor Kelsen advocated. Speaking in the civil law 
context, however, scholars have observed that “French constitutional review is 
quite unique.”8 A majority of the members of the distinctive French court have 
political backgrounds, including all former presidents of the Republic, and some 
have no formal professional legal training.9 Moreover, this court “is not situated 
at the summit of a hierarchy of judicial or administrative courts. In that sense it is 
not a supreme court in the meaning of the Supreme Court of the US.”10
But another difference needs mention here. In many civil law jurisdictions, it 
seems that the customary path to judicial office, and to rising in the judiciary, is 
a careerist one separate from the path of the practising bar. The route to promotion 
involves satisfying and hopefully impressing those in higher positions in the judi-
cial hierarchy. American lawyers come to the bench in a very different way: 
“Because American judges sit on courts of widely varying types and come from 
a variety of backgrounds and experiences, it is difficult to generalize about them. 
Two generalizations, however, are possible. First, judges in the United States ini-
tially come to the bench from other lines of legal work and after a substantial 
number of years of professional experience. Second, once on the bench they do 
not, generally, follow a promotional pattern through the ranks of the judiciary. 
In these respects, American judges differ from judges in the common-law and 
civil-law systems in other parts of the world.”11
Again, the US experience is distinct from that of common law systems else-
where and civil law systems. In this instance, that distinctiveness might erode 
the power over American judges wielded by any appellate court, including 
a Supreme Court. Indeed, Professor Dalton suggested 30 years ago that the typical 
American trial court judge might not care much about whether she was affirmed 
or reversed.12
 7 See T. Stevens, G. Williams, A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom? A View from the High 
Court of Australia, 24 Legal Studies 188 (2004).
 8 M-C Ponthoreau, F. Hourquebie, The French Conseil Constitutionnel: An Evolving Form 
of Constitutional Justice, (in:) Harding & Leyland, supra note 4, at 81, 82.
 9 Id. at 86-87.
10 Id. at 95.
11 D. Meador, American Courts 49 (2000).
12 H. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 “The Yale Law Journal” 
62 (1985). See generally, R. L. Marcus, Appellate Review in the Reactive Model: The Example of the 
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But an overarching distinction between the common law and the civil law 
versions of the judicial role seems to outweigh all the messiness of the distinction 
noted above. In civil law systems, “the role and function of the judiciary . . . were 
rigidly circumscribed. The judge’s role was a subservient and bureaucratic one: 
he was required to verify the existence and applicability of statutory norms to 
a case at hand . . . To recognize a judge-made law in this system was to diagnose 
pathology.”13
This is a key point Professor Cappelletti emphasized in his analysis of diverg-
ing attitudes toward judicial review, tracing the civil law view to the French Revolu-
tion. He pointed to “the revolutionary legislators’ profound distrust of the judges,” 
which led to an effort “to prevent the judicial organs from interfering in the leg-
islative sphere and to ensure that they apply only the letter of the law. This was 
a phase in the development of the concept which soon resulted in the great French 
codification, and concept that the entire body of law could and should be con-
tained in written instruments.”14
Things were markedly different in England, Professor Cappelletti explained, 
because “the English judiciary . . . generally enjoyed the respect of all as a pro-
tector of individuals,” with the result that “the English legal tradition had often 
tended to assign a subordinate role to the legislative function of King and Parlia-
ment, holding that the law was not created but ascertained or declared. Common 
law was fundamental law, and, although it could be complemented by the legisla-
tor, it could not be violated by him.”15 As we shall see in Part III, this difference 
means that being a court in a common law system carries with it much broader 
authority. A supreme court in such a system is, as a result, much more supreme.
II. THE DISTINCTIVE HISTORY OF THE US SUPREME COURT 
AND THE US FEDERAL SYSTEM
It may be true, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill said in 2002, that the US 
Supreme Court is “the world’s best-known supreme court.”16 But that does not 
mean it was inevitable it would attain that status from the outset, or that the basic 
American Federal Courts, (in:) A. Uzelac, C. H. van Rhee (eds.), Nobody’s Perfect: Comparative 
Essays in Appeals and Other Means of Recourse Against Judicial Decisions in Civil Matters (2014) 
at 105.
13 A. Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making, (in:) D. W. Jackson, C. Neal Tate 
(eds.), Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (1992) at 41, 42.
14 Cappelletti, supra note 3, at 13.
15 Id. at 36–37.
16 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, The Constitution 
Unit 12–13 (May 1, 2002), quoted in M. Fennell, Emergent Identity. A Comparative Analysis of the 
 A COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE... 19
structure set up at the outset made the current reality likely. Although some 21st 
century scholars have concluded that “a constitutional court’s success or failure 
depends as much on legal design as on the political culture in which a court oper-
ates,”17 the American experience provides considerable reason to credit political 
culture for the present eminence of the American court. As a starting point, it is 
worth emphasizing again that this does not seem a particularly common law – as 
opposed to distinctively American – circumstance: “[T]he UK Supreme Court 
will never mirror the US Supreme Court, because the new UK Supreme Court 
is designed to create a more muted and less recognizable court identity than that 
of the US Supreme Court.”18
Making predictions early on about how courts will turn out is risky, as a 2011 
book by Professor Crowe, a political scientist, on the evolution of the US Court 
emphasizes. Thus, he begins with the “sorry scene” when the US Supreme Court 
first convened in New York City in 1790; only four of the six justices even both-
ered to show up, and the Court had no cases to decide.19 “With several distin-
guished men having refused appointment and the docket languishing without any 
substantial business, the Court of the late eighteenth century was a feeble institu-
tion.”20 Perhaps mighty oaks will grow from tiny acorns, but there is no guarantee 
that will happen.
This reality might not entirely have surprised the Framers of the US Consti-
tution, who were decidedly ambivalent, or perhaps a better word is divided, on 
the proper role for the federal judiciary in general. Although the US Constitution 
did create a Supreme Court, it did not create any other federal courts, leaving 
that to Congress. That ambivalent feature of the judiciary article of the Consti-
tution resulted from a profound disagreement between the Jeffersonians, who 
favoured state governments, and the Federalists, who emphasized national gov-
ernmental powers. The Jeffersonians resisted the idea of a cadre of federal judges 
across the land who owed primary allegiance to the national government and 
not the state in which they sat. The first Congress nonetheless created a lower 
federal court system and gave the Supreme Court authority to review the deci-
sions of those federal courts as well as the decisions of state courts when those 
decisions involved issues of federal law. The seeds for federal judicial power were 
therefore planted early.
The early debate between the Federalists and the Jeffersonians reflected 
a divide that has not vanished, and also bears on the structure of the American 
New Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 “Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal” 279, 297 (2008).
17 K. Lach, W. Sadurski, Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between Adoles-
cence and Maturity, (in:) Harding & Leyland, supra note 4, at 52, 57.
18 Fennell, supra note 15, at 305.
19 J. Crowe, Building the Judiciary 1 (2011).
20 Id. at 2.
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court system, or better perhaps to say systems (including the state courts). 
At first,there was little federal statutory law, but much judge-made common law. 
That law was shaped by state courts and, after their creation, also by federal 
courts. But the US Supreme Court never had authority review that common law 
decisions of state supreme courts unless there was a claim the state court decision 
violated some provision of federal law. But when federal courts made common 
law decisions, as we shall see, they felt free until the 1930s to disregard state court 
decisions.
Over the last 200 years the prominence of American federal law has increased 
dramatically. Indeed, 50 years ago it seemed that the balance of law-making 
power had shifted so far that Jeffersonian localism was dead. But in reality local-
ism has not died, and it has enjoyed something of a resurgence in recent decades. 
As a result, in the US there is not just one Supreme Court. Instead, each of the 
50 states has a supreme court that is the supreme arbiter of the law of that state.
This circumstance is surely not an inevitable feature of a common law system. 
Indeed, it may not be true of many others. It is surely not true of England and 
Wales,21 and in Canada the national supreme court is the ultimate arbiter of most 
legal questions, not the provincial courts.22 At the same time, there may be civil 
law systems in countries that emphasize localism – Switzerland comes to mind 
as a possible example.
But those seeds depended on more than the structural question whether to 
have a Supreme Court and whether to have lower federal courts. The American 
political soil may have been particularly susceptible to growing independent and 
powerful judicial institutions. As de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s: “I do 
not think that, until now, any nation in the world has constituted judicial power 
in the same manner as the Americans.”23 In such a system of government, judges 
are likely to wield substantial power.
That power links up with the common law system because judges are not 
entirely beholden to the legislature to make law, and it empowers appellate courts 
in general and Supreme Courts in particular because the common law notion 
of precedent makes their decisions farther reaching than a civil law court’s ruling 
an a single case. But another factor is the selection process that produces judges 
with significant backgrounds and only a weak sense of belonging to a bureau-
cratic judicial institution. Professor Kagan has graphically described this distinc-
21 Consider the views offered in 2006 by The Economist: “Power in Britain has long been more 
centralized than in America or other European countries, but it has become more so in the past 
50years.” A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Council, The Economist, Feb. 25, 2006, at 60.
22 See P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada (4th ed. 229–33 2002). See also infra text at 
note 62 for a contrast between the Canadian and US approach to common law powers of the federal 
supreme court and lower federal courts.
23 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 93, H. C. Mansfield, D. Winthrop translation, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press (2000) (originally published in 1835).
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tive feature: “Compared to most national judiciaries, American judges are less 
constrained by legal formalisms; they are more policy-oriented, more attentive 
to the equities (and inequities) of the particular situation. In the decentralized 
American legal system, if one judge closes the door on a novel legal argument, 
claimants can often find a more receptive judge in another court.”24
This feature may also tend to weaken the appellate courts’ (and therefore 
Supreme Court’s) control over judicial actions by lower courts. At least in the US, 
that limitation on the authority of higher courts is fortified by stringent limi-
tations on timing of appellate review and scope of appellate review. Different 
from most civil law countries, in the US appellate review is allowed only after 
a “final judgment” has been entered in the trial court,25 and even then is limited to 
the record made in the trial court. In Continental systems, opening the record to 
new arguments and even new evidence on appeal is the norm, but not in America. 
So appellate courts are circumscribed in their ability to control what lower courts 
do, and are less “supreme” as a result. Most American cases never reach a posture 
(final judgment) in which an appeal can be taken, and for those cases appellate 
courts in general – and Supreme Courts in particular – are ordinarily not able to 
wield any power.26 If structural features are emphasized in relation to the power 
of appellate courts, these must be considered among the most important.
This distinctiveness of the appellate function bears also on the question 
of remedies available in the US Supreme Court in particular, and American appel-
late courts more generally. These courts are part of the overall US court system, 
and their authority is limited to appellate review of decisions by lower courts. As 
a consequence, these remedies are, in general, to affirm or reverse what the lower 
court has done in the case, basing these decisions on the record and arguments 
made in the lower court. The Supreme Court does not itself choose or implement 
the remedy.
It appears that supreme courts elsewhere would wield broader powers and 
deploy additional remedies. More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court of India 
decided that “public interest litigation in India [would be] primarily judge-led and 
even to some extent judge-induced; the product of juristic and judicial activism 
of our Supreme Court.”27 Recent newspaper reports in the US say, for example, 
that India’s Supreme Court ordered in 1998 that all public transport in Delhi be 
switched to compressed natural gas,28 and that in 2014 it ordered an investigation 
24 R. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 16 (2001).
25 See, e.g., 28 USC. ‘1291.
26 In exceptional circumstances, it may be possible for an appellate court to intervene in a case 
using a writ of mandamus, but this is quite exceptional. See infra text accompanying note 106.
27 P. N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 “Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law” 561, 561 (1985). The author was then a justice of the Supreme Court of India, 
and about to become chief justice.
28 G. Harris, Beijing’s Bad Air Would Be A Step Up for Smoggy Delhi, “New York Times”, Jan. 
26 (2014), at 6 (“In 1998, India’s Supreme Court ordered that Delhi’s taxis, three-wheelers and buses 
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into charges that village elders in West Bengal ordered a gang rape of a 20-year-
old woman as “punishment” for a the victim’s romantic relationship with a man 
from another community.29 Similarly, in Bangladesh the High Court responded to 
a petition by “activists and lawyers” by ordering an investigation into a clothing 
factory fire that killed 112 employees.30
These are simply not the sorts of things that American courts, including 
supreme courts, would do. The US federal courts, for example, may only decide 
“cases or controversies” involving adversary parties who assert “legal” rights to 
judicial relief. This contrasts with “abstract” review done by a constitutional court 
in the Kelsen mode; as the leading treatise on the US federal courts explains, “[t]he 
courts of the United States do not sit to decide questions of law presented in a vac-
uum, but only those question that arise in a ‘case or controversy’.”31 “Unconsti-
tutional statutes there may be, but unless they are involved in a case properly 
susceptible of judicial determination, the courts have no power to pronounce that 
they are unconstitutional.”32 Instead, the federal courts will only decide cases 
presented by litigants with “standing to sue.”33
In American federal-court litigation, then, the initiative rests with the parties, 
not with the court, and only when a case is presented by genuine adversaries with 
legal rights at stake may the court decide. But the breadth of judicial remedies 
in American litigated cases – often called “public law” cases34 – probably out-
strips what courts can do in most civil law systems, perhaps also common law 
jurisdictions. American judicial remedies in such cases may command the other 
branches of government to do or stop doing something even though the political 
actors in those other branches of government strongly want to pursue their cho-
sen course. Particularly tensions can result when a federal court enters such an 
order against a state government. Those remedies are usually not directly granted 
or administered by supreme courts, and although lower court decisions granting 
such remedies are subject to appellate review that review is often under an “abuse 
of discretion” standard that accords substantial latitude to the lower courts.
be converted to compressed natural gas, but the resulting improvements in air quality were short-lived 
as cars flooded the roads.”).
29 High Court Orders Inquiry of Gang Rape, S.F. Chron., Jan. 25, 2014, at A4.
30 J. Ali Manik, E. Barry, Months After Deadly Fire, Owners of Bangladesh Factory Surrender 
to Court, “New York Times”, Feb. 10, 2014, at A8. See also S. Shoaib Hasan, Top Court Confronts 
Military on Missing Persons, “New York Times”, April 23, 2014, at A9 (reporting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court is moving to prosecute military officials in civil courts for failing to produce 
missing persons”).
31 Ch. A. Wright, M. K. Kane, Law of Federal Courts 61 (7th ed. 2011).
32 Id. at 62.
33 See id. ‘13.
34 The classic study of this subject is A. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 “Harvard Law Review” 1281 (1976).
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But it can hardly be said that American courts shy from employing forceful 
remedies. Perhaps the most striking recent example of such “public law” remedies 
is the US district court order that the State of California reduce its prison popu-
lation because the level of crowding violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on “cruel and unusual punishment.”35 The district court’s injunction emerged 
from years of litigation about overcrowding, and directed that the prison popula-
tion be reduced by release of prisoners before their sentences were fully served, 
perhaps as many as 46,000 prisoners. Professor Issacharoff has called this case 
“the most significant class action litigation of the past decade.”36 Justice Scalia, 
dissenting in the Supreme Court, called it “perhaps the most radical injunction 
issued by a court in our Nation’s history,” an order that “ignores bedrock limita-
tions on the power of Article III judges, and takes federal courts widely beyond 
their institutional capacity.”37 He also deplored “the inevitable murders, robberies, 
and rapes to be committed by the released inmates.”38 The majority, meanwhile, 
concluded its opinion with an admonition to the district court to consider revis-
ing its order and to give weight to any concerns about public safety.39 But when 
the district court did not change the injunction, the Supreme Court did not take up 
the case again, prompting Justice Scalia to taunt the majority with the argument 
that “[t]he [Court’s] bluff [regarding revision of the injunction that was subject 
to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal] has been called, and the Court has 
nary a pair to lay on the table.”40 This case may illustrate both the aggressiveness 
of American federal courts and the limited authority the Supreme Court has to 
rein them in. Perhaps the Supreme Court is not so “supreme” after all.
Though the case or controversy limitation distinguishes the American fed-
eral courts from the Kelsen model, it cannot be said to be integral to all common 
law systems. By the late 18th century the power of English judges to give advi-
sory opinions was well recognized.41 The Supreme Court of Canada similarly 
may take advisory jurisdiction.42 At least some American states do allow their 
supreme courts to provide Kelsen-style advance review of proposed legislation.43 
The Supreme Court of India treats informal communications from citizens as 
35 Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011).
36 S. Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 “Loyola University of Chicago Law Re-
view” 369, 375 (2012).
37 131 S.Ct. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 1957.
39 Id. at 1946.
40 Brown v. Plata, 134 S.Ct. 1, 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting from delay of application for a stay of en-
forcement of district court order).
41 Wright, Kane, supra note 31, at 66.
42 Hogg, supra note 22, at 239–41.
43 M. C. Dorf, Abstract and Concrete Review, (in:) V. Amar, M. Tushnet (eds.), Global Perspec-
tives on Constitutional Law (2009), at 3, 4 (reporting that Massachusetts permits review of the consti-
tutionality of proposed legislation).
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sufficient to invoke its “epistolary jurisdiction,” and then eschews the adversary 
method in handling such cases, sometimes appointing scholars or others to inves-
tigate underlying circumstances and report back to the court.44 And it seems that 
the Indian court is at least as aggressive as American courts in using “public law” 
remedies without worrying about “standing to sue.”
So the US arrangement is distinctive in ways that could enable and hobble 
the Supreme Court. It could be hobbled by the case or controversy requirement if 
no litigation between parties with legal rights at stake arose. It could be hobbled 
by inability to intervene in proceedings in lower courts in most cases, or in time 
to make a difference. It could be empowered because so much can depend on what 
courts can order or reorder in American society. The American experience need 
not be everyone’s experience, and might come closer to being unique.
One final point should be made before turning to specific heads of this paper. 
That is to emphasize how long this American institution took to build. Profes-
sor Crowe’s recent work emphasizes the gradual and long process by which 
the weakling US Supreme Court of the 18th century became the potent Supreme 
Court of the 21st century. Very few governments have lasted nearly as long as 
the Court (and the US government) has lasted. In Europe, for example, the only 
others of similar or greater age are the UK and Switzerland. And the UK is now 
confronting the possibility of secession by Scotland. Professor Crowe’s point 
about the two centuries it took to build the American Supreme Court is that at 
many points along the way that process depended on political judgments made by 
the political branches.45 Some or most of those might have gone another way, and 
if they had the US Court would likely have a different profile.
In sum, the US is distinctive and instructive because (a) it has a common law 
system, in (b) a federal state (including 50 “mini” state supreme courts authorized 
to pronounce common law rules), with (c) broad authority to interpret federal leg-
islation, and (d) authority also to design and refine the procedure used in the fed-
eral courts. One more distinction should be mentioned – our Supreme Court is not 
subject to review by any outside body. In the EU, the presence of the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights presents a very dif-
44 Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 572–74.
45 Professor Crowe examines a variety of episodes in the two centuries it took to bring American 
judicial institutions to their present eminence. For those who are interested, here is a short summary: 
The first episode is the adoption of the First Judiciary Act in 1789 (chp. 2); the second is the reorgani-
zation of the federal judiciary during the first half of the 19th century (chp. 3); the third is the empow-
erment of the judiciary by the Compromise of 1850, which admitted California to the union as a free 
state and began the period leading up to the American Civil War (chp. 4); the fourth is the restructuring 
of the federal judiciary between 1877 and 1913 (chp. 5); the fifth was what he calls the bureaucrati-
zation of the judiciary between 1914 and 1939 (chp. 6); and the sixth was the increased specialization 
of the judicial branch between 1939 and 2000 (chp. 7).
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ferent situation.46 In the US, the Supreme Court occasionally invokes or refers 
to non-American legal principles, sufficiently frequently to prompt apoplectic 
objections from some members of Congress.47 But nothing can make the US 
Supreme Court accept those “un-American” legal pronouncements, whether or 
not Congress can forbid consideration of them.
III. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN A COMMON LAW SYSTEM
Being a Supreme Court is different in a common law system. As noted above,48 
the civil law limits on judicial action have been traced to the French Revolution. 
That distinction evidently endures; in France now, one begins with “the sacred 
character of statute law.”49 Surely a legislature would appreciate having its stat-
utes regarded as sacred. Surely a court system attuned to regard statutes as sacred 
would be reluctant to stray far from their literal commands. And perhaps surely, it 
would be attractive to such a court system to declare that judicial decisions were 
simply resolutions of disputes about how the sacred statutes apply, and therefore 
not precedent for later judicial decisions, which should look only to the sacred 
statutes.
A common law system is different. Indeed, one could say that the very idea 
of a common law system is at odds with legislative supremacy. Where exactly 
did the royal judges in England who created the common law find it? Surely not 
in Acts of Parliament. Instead, they looked to precedent, which obviously con-
tained the work product of earlier generations of judges. But as one follows this 
development back up the line, one is left with a troubling initial question – what is 
the ultimate source of all this law? Is it simply the creation of the judges? That is 
when one is tempted toward embracing some version of “natural law,” somewhat 
like saying that God created the law, and judges are in a sense the priests who 
have the skill and training to discern that law.
This is not just an American phenomenon. Thus, a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of India explained the “activist” bent of that court in terms that would be 
anathema to the makers of the French Revolution: “There is a myth strongly nur-
tured in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and propagated by many jurists that judges do 
46 For a thoughtful analysis of some of these issues, see J. C. Cohen, The European Preliminary 
Reference and US Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Feder-
alism, 44 “American Journal of Comparative Law” 421 (1996).
47 For a contrast, see A. Lollini, The South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning 
Patterns Based on Foreign Law, 8 “Utrecht Law Review” 55 (2012) (exploring the use by supreme 
courts, particularly the one in South Africa, of legal principles from other countries).
48 See supra text at note 14.
49 Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 8, at 82.
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not make law, that they merely interpret law. Law is there, existing and immanent, 
and judges merely find it. The lawmaking function does not belong to them – it 
belongs to the legislature – and judges merely reflect what the legislature has said. 
This is the proclaimed theory of the judicial function, but I am afraid that it hides 
the real nature of the judicial process. It has been deliberately constructed in order 
to insulate judges against vulnerability to public criticism, and to preserve their 
image of neutrality, which is regarded as necessary for enhancing their credibility. 
It also helps judges escape accountability for what they decide, because they can 
always plead helplessness (even if the law they declare is unjust) by saying that it 
is the law made by the legislature and that they have no choice but to give effect 
to it.”50
In such a system, being a Supreme Court means being quite supreme. For 
a wide variety of important subjects, judges themselves devise, develop, and 
refine the legal rules that determine the rights of other citizens. In France, this 
process may have led to revolution, but in England it did not. Instead, it was 
imported into America, where local courts followed the English common law tra-
dition, and often also followed English common law cases on questions like rules 
of contract law. After the American Revolution, a number of American statutes, 
by statute, “received” English common law as the law of the state.
That reception of English common law left open the question what that law 
became after it was “received.” Could it be changed? The English judges did 
not stop refining and improving their common law at the time of the American 
Revolution, or when given states decided to “receive” it as their own. Should 
American states be locked into English common law that had been rejected by 
the courts of England? The question answers itself, whether or not there was 
a formal “reception” of English common law in a particular American state.
The answer was that the courts of the state could interpret and improve 
the state common law, just as the English courts could interpret and improve 
the English common law. That task was one of the things that were on the minds 
of the Framers of the US Constitution when they debated creating lower federal 
courts. At least some were concerned that having a phalanx of federal judges 
acting in the common law manner would raise the risk that state interests, and 
perhaps even state court decisions about issues of common law, would not be 
recognized in federal court. Seemingly to assuage this concern, when it created 
the lower federal courts in 1789 Congress included in the First Judiciary Act 
50 Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 562–63. He also quotes Lord Reid, an English judge, as follows: 
“There was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law – they only 
declare it. Those with a taste for fairy tales deem to have thought that in some Aladdin’s cave there is 
hidden the Common Law in all its spendour and that on a judge’s appointment there descends on him 
knowledge of the magic words Open Sesame. Bad decisions are given when the judge has muddled 
the password and the wrong door opens. But we do not believe in fairy tales any more.” Id. at 563 
(quoting Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22 (1972)).
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a provision commonly known as the Rules of Decision Act, which directs federal 
judges to apply “the laws of the several states” in cases before them.51
The problem then was whether this statute applied to “state” common law 
– the decisions of state courts. In 1842, the US Supreme Court ruled that this 
statute52 did not apply to state court decisions: “In the ordinary use of language 
it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They 
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and not themselves laws.”53 This 
decision meant that federal judges were free to act as common law judges and 
continue to develop rules of common law in the traditional manner of the judi-
cial priesthood. That law would not be “federal” law (which the US Constitution 
declares is the supreme law of the land), so the US Supreme Court would not be 
supreme in declaring general common law. But it would be free of any outside 
constraint in doing so.
In the view of many, this freedom for federal judges to shape common law 
principles produced undesirable results in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.54 
American Progressives found that federal judges too often interpreted this com-
mon law in ways that favoured business interests over the interests of consumers 
and others.55 State court judges might modernize their states’ common law to take 
account of the challenges of an industrializing society, but their efforts might be 
frustrated were litigants able to get their cases into federal court, where federal 
judges’ hidebound version of “common law” applied. Strong objections to this 
behaviour included Justice Holmes critique that it seemed to rest on the assump-
tion that there was “a transcendental body of law outside any particular State 
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”56 This contretemps 
51 See 28 USC. ‘1652: “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties 
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of de-
cision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”
52 Note that this is an example of statutory construction, a topic covered in Part IV. The Justices 
of the Supreme Court in 1842 assumed that the members of Congress who enacted the statutory pro-
vision in issue – a part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 – shared their vision of the judicial role. But 
as noted later in text, that vision was fading, as a “positivist” interpretation of law emerged in the 19th 
century and supplanted a “natural law” notion that law did somehow suffuse the atmosphere.
53 Swift v. Tyson, 41 US 1, 12 (1842).
54 In terms of the issues addressed in Part VI on constitutional interpretation, it is worth noting 
that during this same period the Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process clause of the Constitution 
as constricting the authority of the state legislatures to enact some kinds of protective legislation. See, 
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908) (invalidating state statute that set limit of ten hours per day 
for women to work).
55 For a careful examination of this development, see E. Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive 
Constitution (2000) (describing the growing disenchantment of progressive Americans with the tenor 
and content of federal court decisions on issues of “common law”).
56 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 US 
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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emphasizes, however, the great importance of common law judges who are not 
bound to respect the legislature’s word as sacred.
These circumstances fostered a 19th century movement in the US to “codify” 
all of common law that began around the same time the French were codifying 
all their law,57 seeking to supplant the entirety of common law with statutory 
codes.58 One important goal of this effort was rein in American common law 
judges. Those judges often took a very strict attitude toward legislation, regarding 
it as un unwelcome “intrusion” into the common law.59 The codification effort 
continued through the 19th century; California, for example, “codified” its law 
in 1872. But the common law authority of state court judges did not vanish; even 
in California the “codified” common law is applied in terms of myriad judicial 
interpretations, and those interpretations built originally on prior common law 
precedents. Indeed, the codification legislation itself was build on a foundation 
of common law precedents.
With regard to the common law powers of federal judges, however, the water-
shed came in 1938, when the US Supreme Court decided in the famous case Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins60 that it had been wrong in 1842 to hold that the Rules 
of Decision Act excused federal judges from following and applying decisions 
of state courts. Indeed, it held that this judicial behaviour violated the US Con-
stitution: “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts 
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether 
the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest 
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general 
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they 
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution 
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”61
Even a common law country with a federal form of government might reject 
this attitude. Thus, Canada permits its federal supreme court to decide common 
law questions from throughout the nation, and a leading Canadian scholar had 
endorsed its refusal to follow the route of the US Supreme Court: “Albert Abel 
argued that the Supreme Court of Canada should follow the lead of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and adopt a rule of restraint in provincial law cases 
like the rule in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. He argues that such a rule would 
make the law more responsive to the differing needs and sentiments of the prov-
inces. . . [W]ith respect to the nine common law provinces it is easy to agree 
with Gibson that ‘such a change would result in many more interprovincial legal 
57 See supra text accompanying note 14.
58 See M. J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860, pp. 16–30 (1977).
59 See id. at 253–66.
60 304 US 64 (1938).
61 Id. at 78.
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discrepancies than could be attributed to cultural differences.’ It must be remem-
bered that whenever a province does desire a different regime of law, it is free 
to enact a statute. In my opinion, the uniformity of the common law through-
out Canada, while undoubtedly at variance with the ideal model of federalism, 
does not really impair provincial autonomy in any practical way. Moreover, 
the rule of uniformity makes Canada’s laws much less complicated than those 
of the United States, and it allows the highest court (with presumably the best 
judges) to apply its talents to the development of all Canada’s laws, both pro-
vincial and federal.”62 So the Supreme Court of Canada is really supreme as to 
common law.
Since 1938, however, the US Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have 
had no authority to develop rules of law to govern the multitude of everyday mat-
ters addressed by the common law. True, as attitudes on federal power evolved 
Congress was found to have broader powers to legislate on matters that had been 
governed by common law, and under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause that 
legislation might displace the common law. But federal judges – as common law 
deciders – could not make similar decisions.63
State courts could make such decisions, however. Accordingly in the US 
we have not one Supreme Court, but 50 – one for each state.64 Note that in its 
1938 decision the US Supreme Court recognized the possibility that “the law 
of the state shall be declared by is legislature in a statute or by its highest court 
in a decision.”65 Subject to state law, those state courts have “supreme” authority 
over the content of state common law. The US Supreme Court can alter their 
decisions based on that law only by concluding that some federal constitutional or 
statutory reason exists for rejecting that decision.
IV. STATUTORY SUPREMACY
Perhaps American courts might be more like the French when it comes to 
statutes, however. Being a “supreme” court would not be so supreme then. But 
having a two-party political system and a bi-cameral legislature, plus a President 
62 Hogg, supra note 22, at 231–32.
63 See T. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 “University of Chicago Law 
Review” 1 (1985) (arguing that the only branch of the federal government that is restrained under this 
constitutional doctrine is the judiciary, since both Congress and the Executive have broad powers to 
affect legal rules across the country).
64 Technically there are also similar judicial bodies to make decisions on local law in the District 
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and also the Virgin Islands and Guam. And one state 
– Louisiana – originated as a civil law jurisdiction, so it presents a singular profile.
65 See supra text at note 61.
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with veto power, limits this constraint on the courts. As Professor Crowe noted 
in his study of the growth of judicial power in the US, one strategy Congress 
might employ to reach a compromise would be “drafting vague statutes in need 
of judicial interpretation.”66 Even if French judges can treat their statutes as “scrip-
ture,”67 American judges sometimes cannot. More generally, it has seemed that 
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have interpreted statutes broadly or 
narrowly as they have found more suitable, rather than solely when Congress has 
left the question to them.
Indeed, interpretation of statutes may shift over time. A prime example is 
another provision in the First Judiciary Act of 1789, known as the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, which says in full: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”68 It should be clear that this statute 
invoked uncertain language – what is “the law of nations”? Perhaps due to that 
uncertainty, it sat on the books but was not used in the courts for about 190 years, 
until the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in 1980 that it could 
be used for modern human rights claims.69 This possibility produced tremendous 
excitement in the academic community70 and eventually led to two Supreme Court 
decisions limiting the application of the Act.71 These decisions produced predi-
cations that human rights litigation would gravitate to the state courts, because 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute would bind all the federal courts.
Supreme Court interpretations of statutes are vulnerable to “reversal” by 
Congress. One prominent example occurred after the US Supreme Court made 
several rulings in its 1989–1990 Term that many viewed as unduly restrictive 
in cases brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,72 the basic law 
against employment discrimination. In 1990, Congress, dominated by the Dem-
ocratic Party, passed a Civil Rights Act of 1990, containing strong pro-plaintiff 
provisions for Title VII cases. President George H.W. Bush, a Republican, vetoed 
66 Crowe, supra note 19, at 12.
67 See supra text accompanying note 49 (referring to the “sacred character of statute law” 
in France).
68 28 USC. ‘1350.
69 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
70 See B. Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 “Notre Dame Law Review” 
1467, 1468 n. 3 (2014) (reporting that more than 4,000 law review articles have cited the statute since 
1980). The Stephens article provides a very thorough overview of this litigation experience.
71 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) (upholding judicial power in appropriate circum-
stances); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (applying a presumption against 
extraterritoriality to actions under the statute).
72 The decisions were Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164 (1990); Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio, 490 US 642 (1990); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1990); Martin v. Wilks, 
490 US. 755 (1990).
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the bill. The following year, Congress came back and adopted less aggressive 
legislation, which President Bush signed into law.73
But as the veto of the 1990 Civil Rights Act suggests, making changes by leg-
islation is a “sticky” and difficult process. As Professor Farhang has pointed out 
in his recent analysis of American reliance on statutes that permit private enforce-
ment of public norms, one of the reasons legislatures might favour such statutes is 
that they would want to protect their legislative choices (favouring enforcement) 
from the results of later elections (that might produce majorities with different 
attitudes or Executive actors who have different priorities).74 Judges’ decisions 
can play a very prominent role in the application of statutes. Early experiences 
under the Title VII legislation, for example, made supporters of the legislation 
glad they chose to authorize private enforcement because federal judges took 
an expansive view of its provisions even after the election in 1968 of President 
Nixon, who had a less enthusiastic attitude toward anti-discrimination efforts.75 
The basic message is that the federal courts have become arbiters of statutory law 
to a significant extent, and the US Supreme Court is the supreme arbiter in that 
mode.
For the last 20 years, the American government has more often been in “sticky” 
mode than in “fast track” mode. Unlike the UK, it has three genuine branches, 
and they are genuinely independent of each other. Considering Congress and 
the Legislature, divided government has been the norm more than single-party 
domination. As a result, legislative stasis has also been a norm, perhaps never 
more so than since 2010. Under these circumstances, it has been suggested that 
the Supreme Court has even more latitude than normally for interpreting federal 
statutory law in ways it finds congenial.
A prime example of that sort of activity has been judicial creation of private 
rights to sue for violation of statutory or regulatory norm. Congress can surely 
create a private right to sue when it wants to bolster enforcement with private 
initiative. For example, in 1890 it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act,76 forbidding 
contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade. This initial legislative effort had 
some unfortunate flaws, so in 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act 
to correct flaws in the original legislation and also add a private right permitting 
those injured by antitrust violations to sue for treble damages.77
One might infer from the antitrust act experience that Congress would spec-
ify whether there should be a private right of action. But in several instances 
73 Pub. L. No. 102–166, 1205 Stat. 1071–1100 (codified in scattered sections of 42 USC. For anal-
ysis of the legislation, see Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, 
23 “Stetson Law Review” 53 (1993).
74 See S. Farhang, The Litigation State (chp. 2) (2011).
75 See id. at 129–31.
76 15 USC. ‘1.
77 15 USC. ‘15.
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the Supreme Court took up the cudgel even though Congress did not so authorize. 
The most prominent example is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which cre-
ated the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and authorized it to promulgate 
regulations and enforce the antifraud provisions of the Act. This Act, along with 
other legislation, was designed to deal with the activities that led to the stock 
market crash in 1929 and ensuing depression of the 1930s. But Congress did not 
authorize private suits by those claiming injury due to violations of the Act. The 
SEC promulgated rules, including Rule 10b-5 forbidding false statement in con-
nection with the sale of a security. The lower courts began to entertain private 
actions brought by those who claimed to be victims of such fraud.
In 1964, the Supreme Court endorsed the creation of a private right to sue 
by the courts, reasoning that it was “a necessary supplement to [SEC] action. As 
in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunc-
tive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the [antifraud] 
requirements.”78 If one measures success by impact, this court-enabled effort 
was a great success, particularly when combined with the broadened class-action 
procedures introduced by amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1966. By 2006, it was said that securities fraud class actions had become “the 
800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other forms of class actions.”79
Many did not like this 800-pound gorilla, and claimed that it had set loose 
predatory litigation in which the merits of the claims did not matter because 
defendants had to settle for considerable amounts due to high litigation costs and 
the risks of putting a “bet the company” case before a lay jury.80 Particularly strong 
objections to securities class actions came from high tech companies in Silicon 
Valley, and Congress responded in 1995 by passing the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act, which imposed high pleading requirements and a discovery 
stay on such suits. President Clinton vetoed the bill, but Congress almost immedi-
ately re-passed it over his veto. On one level, of course, this legislation confirmed 
(some 30 years after the fact) that the Court had been right in implying a private 
right to sue. At least Congress did not entirely forbid such private actions. Recall 
that Congress can “overrule” the Court on such matters. But Congress clearly did 
also want to curtail such litigation.
Nonetheless, when in 2007 the Supreme Court came to interpret the pleading 
requirements of the new legislation it chose a standard the dissenting Justices 
78 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US 426, 432 (1964).
79 J. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementa-
tion, 106 “Columbia Law Review” 1539, 1539 (2006).
80 See J. C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 
43 “Stanford Law Review” 497 (1991); compare J. Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 “Harvard 
Law Review” 438 (1994). For a more recent examination of related issues, see T. Baker, S. Griffith, 
How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 “Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania Law Review” 755 (2008) (finding that “merits” issues seem to have some effect on 
settlement amounts, but that the amount and provisions of directors’ insurance do also).
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thought too lax, beginning its opinion by citing its 1964 decision authorizing pri-
vate suits and observing that “[t]his Court has long recognized that meritorious 
private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supple-
ment to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, 
by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission.”81 
One might object that this insistence on its own support of private suits in seem-
ing opposition to efforts by Congress to curtail those suits is a bit of effrontery, 
but it well captures the reality that the US Supreme Court considers itself to have 
considerable latitude in interpreting statutes adopted by Congress to fit its mold.82
V. PROCEDURAL SUPREMACY
A very different sort of supremacy has to do with procedure. One could regard 
procedure as inherently a matter for courts to develop and therefore insulated 
against intrusion from other arms of government. There is some support in Amer-
ican scholarship for this view.83 But the historical reality was quite different for 
the American federal courts. From their creation in 1789 until the 1930s, statutes 
directed federal courts to apply the same procedure as state courts.84 In the early 
20th century, a broad movement arose to authorize a set of nationwide procedure 
rules for the federal courts. For a variety of reasons, this legislation was stymied 
in Congress for a quarter century, but it was finally passed in 1934.85 The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure followed in 1938. Thereafter, most states adopted proce-
dure codes modeled on the Federal Rules.86
81 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 552 US 308, 313 (2007).
82 It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court long ago adopted a more restrained attitude 
toward implying private rights to sue. Indeed, Justice Scalia asserted in 2001 that the court-created se-
curities fraud cause of action was “a relic of the heady days in which the Court assumed common-law 
powers to create causes of action.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 US 61, 75 (2001) 
(Scalia, J., concurring).
83 “There are spheres of activity so fundamental and so necessary to a court, so inherent in its 
very nature as a court, that to divest it of its absolute command within these spheres is to make mean-
ingless the very phrase judicial power.” A. Leo Levin, A. G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over 
Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem of Constitutional Revision, 107 “University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review” 1, 30 (1958); see also M. M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did not 
Write Into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 “Texas Law Review” 167, 193 (1979) (arguing that judicial 
supremacy extends to “rulemaking that is indispensable to courts’ functioning”).
84 See Process Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 275, 276; Conformity Act of 1872, 17 Stat 196, 197.
85 See S. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 “University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view” 1015 (1982).
86 See J. Oakley, A. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems 
of Civil Procedure, 61 “Washington Law Review” 1367 (1986).
34 RICHARD MARCUS
This sequence is not the only one found in common law countries. In the UK, 
by way of contrast, procedure had been a common law matter from time imme-
morial until the early 19th century. By then, objections to common law procedure 
had mounted to such a pitch that the judges decided to adopt procedure rules – 
the infamous Rules at Hilary Term, which were the first court-adopted procedure 
rules87 and were condemned as a complete failure by Bentham and many oth-
ers. An early 20th century view from the US was that “it became perfectly clear 
[in England] that delegation of the control of procedural technique to the legal 
profession was a policy which was socially unsound,” so that “legal procedure 
was brought under public, not professional regulation.”88 In 1873–1875, Parlia-
ment passed Judiciary Acts to regulate procedure, but thereafter rules commit-
tees developed revisions. In 1994, the Lord Chancellor appointed Lord Woolf to 
review and propose changes to the rules, and Lord Woolf proposed the adoption 
of the Civil Procedure Act 1997, which Parliament adopted.89 That Act creates 
a committee structure somewhat like the Rules Enabling Act in the US.
In the US, the Federal Rules were drafted for, and promulgated by, the US 
Supreme Court. Although Congress could prevent them from going into effect, that 
would require affirmative action by Congress and the signature of the President.90 
In 1993, one Senator prevented passage of such legislation to alter a rule-amend-
ment package approved by the Supreme court after the House of Representatives 
had passed it and the President had indicated he would sign it.91 From the perspec-
tive of the Court, therefore, a similar form of “stickiness” might prevent changes 
to the rules it adopted.
This authority over the rules of procedure can be exceptionally important, 
perhaps eclipsing even the importance of state-court supremacy in matters 
of common law. A prime example arose in the 1990s, when American courts 
were overwhelmed by suits claiming injury due to exposure to asbestos. After 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation combined all federal-court personal 
injury cases into a single proceeding before a single federal judge in Philadelphia, 
a group of defendants reached a proposed settlement with a group of plaintiff 
lawyers that used a “settlement class action” to substitute a claims process for 
87 Roffery v. Smith, 172 Eng. Rep. 1409, 1409–10 (1834) (noting that the Rules of Hilary Term 
were the first rules of court to have the force of law).
88 E. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 “Harvard Law Review” 725, 
728–29 (1926).
89 For the Civil Procedure Act 1997, see: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/12/contents (last 
visited 7 May 2014).
90 See 28 USC. ‘2074(a).
91 See P. Carrington, D. Aponovich, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Il-
legitimacy of Mass-Torts Settlements Negotiated Under Rule 23, 39 “Arizona Law Review” 461, 485 
(1997) (describing how one senator’s refusal to consent to suspending the Senate’s rules prevented 
passage of legislation that would have changed the amendment package adopted by the Supreme Court 
in 1993).
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individual litigation and, it was hoped, reduce the very high transaction costs 
associated with this form of litigation. That solution was attractive to many.
But as I noted at the time92 the class action rule did not supply the federal 
courts with the authority to supplant applicable state law. As noted above,93 
the Supreme Court ruled in 1938 that federal judges did not have authority to 
make rules of common law, and instead had to accept and apply rules made by 
state-court judges. That is why America has 51 supreme courts, not just one. Yet 
federal judges reviewing settlements of class actions were substituting the very 
detailed deals worked out by those who negotiated the proposed settlement.
In 199794 and 1999,95 the Supreme Court ruled that these efforts to use proce-
dure to resolve the complications of asbestos litigation could not stand, emphasiz-
ing the limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling Act on modifying substantive 
legal rights by use of procedural devices. As the Court explained, “the federal 
courts – lacking authority to replace state tort systems with a national toxic tort 
compensation regime – endeavoured to work with the procedural tools available 
to improve management of federal asbestos litigation.”96
As the Supreme Court saw it, the class-action settlement approved by the dis-
trict court was “[a]n exhaustive document exceeding 100 page, [which] presents 
in detail an administrative mechanism and a schedule of payments to compensate 
class members who meet defined asbestos-exposure and medical requirements.”97 
But the court found that the text of the federal class-action rule “limits judicial 
inventiveness” and could not be stretched to justify this arrangement.98 Con-
cluding, the Court remarked ruefully that “[t]he argument is sensibly made that 
a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most 
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. 
Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.”99 The Supreme Court would 
not be as adventuresome as the district court had been, although Congress might 
not have done anything had the Court permitted this use of the class-action pro-
cedure.
Other recent developments underscore the importance of procedural suprem-
acy in dealing with mass torts, however. Although the Supreme Court stymied 
broad use of class actions to resolve mass tort cases,100 the lower courts looked 
elsewhere within their procedural quivers and found new procedural arrows to 
 92 See R. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 “Cornell Law 
Review” 858, 872–82 (1995).
 93 See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
 94 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997).
 95 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 US 815 (1999).
 96 Amchem, 521 US at 599.
 97 Id. at 603.
 98 Id. at 620.
 99 Id. at 628–29.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 94–99.
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use to slay the dragon of mass tort litigation. As barriers to using class action 
mounted, American lawyers and judges turned more often to the “multidistrict” 
procedure authorized by federal statute.101 The most striking example is the reso-
lution of litigation concerning the pharmaceutical product Vioxx. The US Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the claims of over 4,000 plaintiffs to 
a single federal judge in New Orleans and that judge invited state court judges 
from California and New Jersey to collaborate in fostering a settlement of all 
the cases. Eventually, this judicial collaboration resulted in a mass settlement for 
$4.85 billion. Employing what he regarded as “equitable authority” to manage 
this “quasi class action,” the judge then capped the attorney fees the plaintiff law-
yers could claim (even though many had contracts calling for higher fees) and 
directed that some of that money should be used to pay the court-appointed lead 
counsel for the plaintiffs instead of going to the lawyer who had the contract 
with the given plaintiff.102 Although the “quasi class action” notion is nowhere 
spelled out in a rule or statute, other judges had used the same idea.103 To date, 
no appellate courts have addressed the question whether this sort of innovation is 
permitted. But it stands as another example of the great authority federal courts 
can manage using procedure creatively.
These efforts to make aggressive and creative use of procedure underscore 
the importance of procedure, which is administered by and under the direc-
tion of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Court finds itself in the curious position 
of being both a legislature and a judicial body in regard to federal rules of pro-
cedure when the interpretation of those rules is before it in a litigated case. In 
the view of at least one professor who is now a federal appellate judge, this role 
in rulemaking gives the Court even more latitude in interpreting rules than stat-
utes,104 although there is dissent from this view.105 So this is another way in which 
the US Supreme Court is a peculiarly supreme body.
101 28 USC. ‘1407. For discussion, see E. Sherman, The MDL Model For Resolving Complex Liti-
gation If A Class Action is Not Possible, 82 “Tulane Law Review” (2008).
102 See In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 574 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008).
103 See, e.g., In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn., March 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa Products 
Liability Litigation, 424 F.Supp.2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
104 See K. Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 44 “Hastings Law Journal” 1039, 1093 (1993): “[T]he Court’s imprimatur is placed on 
the Rules; the court has an opportunity to reject whatever Rules it believes are inappropriate and to 
provide further clarification, detail, or changes of any kind in the proposed Rules. Given these sub-
stantial, although largely unexercised, powers of the Court in the promulgation process, a more activist 
role in the interpretative stage, one that considers purpose and policy, is appropriate. Congress has 
explicitly delegated to the Court rulemaking power, and it is not inconsistent to imply the Court has 
greater power to interpret Rules than it does to interpret statutes.”
105 See C. T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 150 “University of Pennsylvania Law Review” 1099 (2002) (arguing that the fact Congress dele-
gated the power to promulgate rules to the Supreme Court does not give it greater latitude to interpret 
those rules as it sees fit).
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The Court’s ability to control the lower courts’ handling of cases before them 
provides a further avenue for it to exercise its supremacy. To take a recent and 
prominent example, in the federal-court litigation challenging Proposition 8, 
the California ballot measure invalidating same-sex marriage, the district judge 
in San Francisco used a new local rule to arrange for the trial to be broadcast 
to a number of other federal courts where people could watch it unfold. Propo-
nents of Proposition 8, who had been allowed to “intervene” in the federal case 
to defend California law, objected to broadcast of the trial, asserting that various 
of their witnesses had been threatened. They objected that the local district court 
had not strictly complied with the procedures for adopting local rules like the one 
used to support broadcast of the trial. The Supreme Court actually took the case 
on short notice, using its “supervisory authority to invalidate local rules that 
were promulgated in violation of Act of Congress.”106 By a 5–4 vote, it forbade 
broadcast of the trial. A network then undertook to obtain verbatim transcripts 
of the trial and have actors do a reading for its audience, so the interested public 
could observe a simulated version of the real trial.
In sum, the procedural authority of the US Supreme Court is too often over-
looked, but it is a supreme authority that can only be changed by Congress, or 
by the rules process over which the Court has the final word. And in cases like 
the same-sex marriage litigation broadcast, it cannot be changed by anything.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
It may seem odd to leave constitutional adjudication until last, but the point 
of this paper is that the supremacy of the US Supreme Court depends on much 
more than that. Needless to say, the US Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter 
of the meaning of the US Constitution. Acting under the “case or controversy” 
requirement of the Constitution, it cannot – as can constitutional courts in some 
other countries – offer advance or abstract evaluations of the constitutionality 
of proposed legislation. Even with legislation that has been adopted, it can act 
only in the context of a concrete case brought by litigants with “standing” to raise 
the issue of constitutionality.
But within those constraints, the Court is supreme. If legislation to change 
the Court’s rulings is a “sticky” prospect, constitutional change is almost frozen. 
In the 220+ years since the first ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted 
in 1791, there have been only 17 more, and the last one was adopted in 1992.107 
106 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct. 705, 713 (2010).
107 The 27th amendment, finally ratified in 1992, was originally submitted for ratification in 1789 
but ratification took over 200 years. This is not an easy process.
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Under the Supremacy Clause, the state courts must follow the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution, and are subject or reversal by the Court if they 
don’t.
The lower courts are equally empowered to pass on the constitutionality 
of legislation and the actions of public officers. That is part of the reason the inde-
pendence and creativity of American judges noted by Professor Kagan108 is so 
important. Applying the Constitution is an everyday task for judges all around 
the nation. Every work day, judges all across America – in federal and state court 
– are called upon to rule whether searches and seizures violate the Fourth Amend-
ment of the US Constitution. Holding that legislation is unconstitutional is much 
rarer, but within the authority (and duty) of every court in the land.
The Supreme Court is not required to take up constitutional issues at the behest 
of other governmental actors, however. Although constitutional courts in other 
countries are evidently mandated to act when presented with such questions by 
other branches of government or by other courts, there is no such commandment 
for the US Supreme Court presently.109 Control over its docket may be essential to 
protect a supreme court against a deluge of cases,110 and it may enable the court to 
accept or reject cases in a strategic manner. Part of that strategy involves a supreme 
court’s recognition that its main job is rule articulation, not error correction. The 
US Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is axiomatic that this Court cannot 
devote itself to error correction.”111 From some perspectives, the Court may even 
seem to “duck” important issues. For example, after the US District Court in San 
Francisco found California Proposition 8 unconstitutional,112 the Supreme Court 
ruled that the “intervenors” did not have “standing” to pursue an appeal of that 
ruling, with the result that the district court ruling the California law was invalid 
therefore stood,113 but the Supreme Court did not have to decide the underlying 
constitutional issue.114
108 See supra text accompanying note 24.
109 Into the 20th century, the Court had some “mandatory” docket, and a small number of cases 
– such as litigation between states – still qualifies. But this effect on its docket is minuscule, and does 
not raise matters of constitutional import as discussed in text.
110 See M. C. Dorf, Abstract and Concrete Review, (in:) V. Amar, M. Tushnet (eds.), Global Per-
spectives on Constitutional Law (2009), at 1, 13 (“In Germany, where anyone can, in principle, bring 
a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court, the success rate of such complaints is 2.5 per-
cent, and the Court has accordingly adopted screening procedures to deny full consideration to most 
complaints.”).
111 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 US 538, 569 (1998).
112 See supra text accompanying note 106, for discussion of the Supreme Court’s order that the tri-
al of the case not be broadcast.
113 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). 
114 But in the companion case, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), the Court found 
that litigants in a similar situation to the proponents of Proposition 8 did have standing to litigate 
whether a federal statute entitled the Defense of Marriage Act was constitutional, and the court ruled 
that it was not. Since then, there have been many decisions in lower courts invalidating other legisla-
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Indeed, it has been argued that the Supreme Court’s ability to defer deci-
sion actually contributes to its decision-making. Thus, when it was proposed 
in the 1970s and 1980s that a new National Court of Appeals be created to resolve 
conflicting decisions among the federal appellate courts, one argument was that 
allowing the lower courts to explore divergent interpretations of the law will 
ultimately assist the Court because those decisions will fully air issues before 
the Court has to decide them.115 In 1983, for example, Justice Stevens issued 
an opinion in regard to the Court’s denial of certiorari in case, explaining that 
“I believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ram-
ifications of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue 
more wisely at a later date.”116 The new court of appeals was also opposed on 
the ground that it would undermine the Supreme Court’s sense of responsibility.117 
That responsibility results from and reaffirms the Court’s supremacy; interpret-
ing the Constitution is the most important aspect of that supremacy, but hardly 
the only one.
VII. CONCLUSION – DECIDING WHICH SYSTEM IS BEST
No one system is “best” for all countries. The system that is best for a given 
nation is dependent on too many variables to support such a sweeping conclusion. 
Although it may be that the specialized constitutional courts recently introduced 
in a number of civil law countries succeed or fail as much due to their design 
as to “political culture,”118 the US experience suggests otherwise. The tech-
nical arrangements for the US Supreme Court were set out in the Constitution 
in 1789, and have remained relatively constant since then.119 As Professor Crowe 
has shown, however, the prominence of the US Supreme Court has increased 
enormously since the 18th century.120 Other scholars have recently suggested that 
tion based on the decision in the Windsor case. See E. Eckholm, Wave of Appeals Expected to Turn 
the Tide on Same-Sex Marriage Bans, “New York Times”, March 23, 2014, at 18.
115 See A. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does the Supreme court Need 
Help?, 67 “Judicature” 28, 37 (1983) (referring to conflicts among the lower courts as “the judicial 
system’s analogue to the adversary process”).
116 McCray v. New York, 461 US 961, 961 (1983).
117 See W. Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 “University of Chicago 
Law Review” 473, 480–85 (1973).
118 See supra text accompanying note 17.
119 True, Congress has changed the number of justices on occasion. On one occasion – the notori-
ous “court-packing scheme” of President Franklin Roosevelt in 1937 – an effort to do that to achieve 
short-term political advantage backfired. And the country has grown hugely since the 18th century, 
both in land mass and population. But the basic arrangements are not really significantly different.
120 See Crowe, supra note 19.
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“[t] ere is a sense in which constitutions and the courts may seem to mature like 
a fine claret.”121 The American experience partly supports that view. The supreme 
or constitutional courts established in many countries in the late 20th century can 
hardly have hit maturity in two decades compared to the American Court, which 
was founded in the 18th century and developed gradually over the ensuing two 
centuries.
As we have seen, the supremacy of the US Supreme Court (and perhaps 
a number of other supreme courts in common law systems) can depend on many 
attributes. Arguably, the most important is the latitude afforded judges in com-
mon law systems to “make law,” which stands in stark contrast to the supposed 
narrowness of the judicial function in many civil law countries.122 In a related 
sense, the supremacy the courts have in interpreting statutes stands as something 
as a counterweight to the legislature’s power to enact them (and to change judicial 
outcomes by further enactment).123 And in the US, the authority of the judici-
ary over procedure can matter at least as much as its supremacy on other mat-
ters.124 So although the supreme court’s supremacy in regard to the meaning 
of the constitution is surely extremely important,125 it is only one among a variety 
of supremacies our Supreme Court exhibits. As a very prominent American judge 
recently put it, “it is fair to ask whether the leading change agent in American 
society in some years has been the Supreme Court.”126 That probably can’t be said 
of many other countries.
Even though it is not possible to proclaim any system “best,” it is very use-
ful to appreciate the consequences of features of any system that those within it 
may take for granted. That is a prime value of comparative studies, like the ones 
on display in this conference. The starting point is, as the organizers foretold, 
the common law/civil law distinction. But that starting point is mainly impor-
tant with regard to the judicial “law making” permitted in common law systems, 
which can make supreme courts nearly as supreme with regard to a range of legal 
issues as they are with respect to constitutional interpretation. Whether this is 
good or bad, I leave to others with the hope that this introduction has identified at 
least some of the issues.
121 A. Harding, P. Leyland, T. Groppi, Constitutional Courts: Forms, Functions and Practice 
in Comparative Perspective, (in:) Harding & Leyland, supra note 4, at 1, 25.
122 See Part III.
123 See Part IV.
124 See Part V.
125 See Part VI.
126 J. S. Sutton, Courts As Change Agents: Do We Want More or Less?, 127 “Harvard Law Re-
view” 1419, 1421 (2014).
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A COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUPREME COURT 
AND ITS FUNCTIONS
Summary
The text presents different attributes of the Supreme Court in common law and civil 
law systems. The author claims that the question of design and function of a supreme 
court, while important, is no more significant than the issue of its institutional status and 
evolution, i.e. something one could refer to as “legal culture”. Neither the “common law 
camp”, nor the “civil law camp” turns out to be monolithic in this regard. 
The distinctive history of the US Supreme Court is presented through the perspective 
of its statutory and procedural supremacy, as well as its power of constitutional 
adjudication. The author indicates that the supremacy of the US Supreme Court depends 
on many factors. Arguably, the most important attribute of the US Supreme Court’s 
supremacy is linked with the latitude offered to judges in common law system to “make 
law”, which stands in contrast to a limited judicial function in many civil law countries. 
The author argues that being a court in a common law system carries with it much broader 
authority. A supreme court in such a system is, as a result, much more supreme. 
The author concludes his comparative remarks by saying that it is not possible to 
proclaim the superiority of one specific system because there are too many variables that 
come into play with regard to respective nations.
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